1. Doubt concerning the existence of spirits arises
from ignorance of their real nature. People usually
imagine spirits to be something apart from the rest
of creation, and the reality of whose existence has
not been proved. Many think of them as imaginary beings,
known to them only through the fantastic tales of their
childhood, and regard their authenticity much as they
would that of the personages of a romance. Without
stopping to inquire whether those tales, divested of
absurd accessories, may not have some foundation of
truth, they see only their absurdities; and not giving
themselves the trouble to peel off the bitter husk in
order to get at the kernel, they reject the whole, just
as others, shocked at certain abuses in religion, confound
the whole subject in the same reprobation. Whatever
ideas we may hold in regard to spirits, the belief in
their existence is necessarily founded on that of the
existence of an intelligent principle distinct from
matter; this belief is therefore incompatible with an
absolute negation of such a principle. We assume then,
as the ground-work of our belief, the existence, survival,
and individuality of the soul, of which spiritualism
is the theoretic and doctrinal demonstration, and spiritism
the practical proof. Let us then, for a moment, leave
out of sight the fact of spirit-manifestations, properly
so called, and let us see to what conclusions are led
by inductive reasoning.
2. If we admit the existence of the soul and its individuality
after death, we must necessarily also admit, first,
that it is of a nature different from that of the body,
since, when separated from the body, it enters upon
a phase of existence distinct from the destiny of the
body; second, that the soul retains, after death, its
individuality and self-consciousness, and the capacity
of feeling happiness and unhappiness, as otherwise it
would be an inert being, and its existence would be
equivalent to non-existence. These points being admitted,
it follows that the soul goes somewhere; but what becomes
of it, and whither does it go? According to the ordinary
belief it goes to heaven or to hell; but where is heaven,
and where is hell? People used formerly to say that
heaven was "up on high," and hell, "down below;" but
what is "up," and what is "down," in the universe, since
we have learned that the earth is round, and that, through
the movement of all the stellar bodies, what is "up"
now, will be "down" twelve hours hence, and this throughout
the immeasurable extent of infinite space? It is true
that, by "below", we may likewise understand the "deep
places of the earth;" but what has become of those "deep
places," since geologists have begun to dig into the
interior of the globe? What has become of those concentric
spheres called the "heaven of fire," the "heaven of
stars," etc., since we have found out that the earth
is not the centre of the universe, and that our sun
is only one of the countless myriads of suns which shine
in space, and each of which is the centre of a planetary
system of its own? Where is now the earth's importance,
lost as it is in this immensity? And by what unjustifiable
privilege shall we assume that this imperceptible grain
of sand, distinguished neither by its bulk, its position,
nor any peculiarity of attribute, is the only sphere
peopled by intelligent creatures? Reason refuses to
admit such an inutility of infinitude; and common sense
declares that all the other worlds of the universe must
be inhabited, and that, being inhabited, they, too,
must furnish their contingent to the realm of souls.
But what, it may next be asked, becomes of the souls
thus multiplied to infinity by the theory of the plurality
of worlds, now that astronomy and geology have annihilated
their ancient habitations? To this question we reply
that, the doctrine which formerly localized souls being
opposed to the data of modern science, another and more
logical doctrine assigns to them, as their domain, not
any fixed and circumscribed localities, but universal
space itself, which is thus seen to be one grand system,
in the midst of which we live, which environs us unceasingly,
and touches us at every point. Is there anything inadmissible
in such a theory, anything repugnant to our reason?
Assuredly not; on the contrary, our reason tells us
that it cannot be otherwise. But, it may next be asked,
what becomes of the doctrine of future rewards and punishments,
if we rob them of their special localities? In replying
to this objection, we must pause to remark that incredulity,
in regard to those rewards and punishments, is ordinarily
provoked by the fact of their being presented under
inadmissible conditions; and that, if - instead of such
conditions, we assume that souls carry their happiness
or their misery in themselves, that their lot is always
determined by their moral state, that the union of good
and sympathetic souls is a source of felicity, and that,
according to their degree of purity, is their power
of penetrating and discerning things that are still
dark to souls of lower degree - all difficulties disappear,
and the grand idea of our continuous existence becomes
comprehensible and acceptable. Let us assume, still
farther, that the degree of each soul's elevation depends
on the efforts it makes for its own amelioration during
series of existences that serve as the means and tests
of its progressive purification, that "angels" are only
the souls of men who have attained to the highest degree
of excellence; that all can attain to that degree by
effort and determination; that those who have attained
to that degree are God's messengers, charged to superintend
the execution of His designs throughout the universe,
and finding their happiness in these glorious missions,
- and we surely attribute to the idea of our future
felicity an end more useful and more attractive than
that of a perpetual state of contemplation which would
be only a perpetual state of inutility. Let us assume,
yet farther, that "demons" also are no other than the
souls of wicked men, not yet purified, but who have
the power to purify themselves like the others, and
it must surely be admitted that such a theory is more
in conformity with the justice and goodness of God than
the assumption that they were created for evil, and
predestined to a perpetuity of misery. Is there, we
ask, in such a theory, anything opposed to reason, anything,
in a word, that the most rigorous logic, or plain common
sense, can find any difficulty in admitting?
The souls, then, that people space, are what we call
spirits: and spirits are nothing but the souls of men
stripped of their envelope of gross terrestrial matter.
If spirits were beings apart from ourselves, their existence
would be merely hypothetical; but, if we admit that
souls exist, we must also admit that spirits are nothing
else than souls, and, if we admit that universal space
is peopled by souls, we must equally admit that spirits
are everywhere. We cannot deny the existence of spirits
without denying the existence of souls.
3. All this, it is true, is only a theory, though
one that is more rational than other theories; but it
is something to possess a theory that is not in contradiction
with reason or science, and if, moreover, this theory
is corroborated by facts, it must be admitted that our
position has the double sanction of reason and experience.
Such corroborating facts we assert to be furnished by
the phenomena of spirit-manifestation, which constitute
the irrefragable proofs of the existence and the survival
of the soul. With many persons, however, belief ends
here; they readily admit the existence of souls, and
consequently that of spirits, but they deny the possibility
of holding communication with them, "because," they
say, "immaterial beings cannot act upon matter." This
denial proceeds from ignorance of the real nature of
spirits, about which the world in general holds exceedingly
false ideas, erroneously regarding them as abstract
beings, as something vague and indefinite; which is
a great mistake. Let us, in the first place, consider
the spirit in reference to its union with the body.
The spirit is the principal being, because it is that
which thinks, and which survives the body, the latter
being only an envelope, a vestment, of gross matter,
that the spirit throws off when it is worn out; but,
besides this material envelope, the spirit has a second
envelope, which is semi-material, and which unites it
to the first: at death, the spirit casts off the first,
but retains the second, to which we give the name of
perispirit. This semi-material envelope, which has the
human form, constitutes, for the spirit, a vaporous,
fluidic body, which, though invisible to us in its normal
state, nevertheless possesses some of the properties
of matter. A spirit is therefore not a mathematical
point, an abstraction, but is a real being, limited
and circumscribed, and lacking only the qualities of
visibility and palpability to show its resemblance on
human beings. Why then should it not act on matter?
Is it because its body is fluidic? But is it not among
the most rarified fluids, those which we call "imponderable,"
as electricity, for example, that man finds his most
powerful motors? Does not imponderable light exercise
a chemical action on ponderable matter? We do not understand
the precise nature of the perispirit; but, supposing
it to be formed of electrical matter, or of something
else equally subtle, why should it not have the same
property of action as electricity, when under the direction
of a will?
4. The existence of the soul and the existence of
God, as consequences of each other, being the basis
of the edifice of spiritism, it is necessary, before
entering on the discussion of this subject, to ascertain
whether our reader admits that basis. If to the questions:
- Do you believe in God? Do you believe you have a soul?
Do you believe in the survival of the soul after death?
he responds with a negative, or even if he simply says:
- I do not know; I should be glad if it were so, but
I do not feel sure of it." (a reply that would be usually
equivalent to a polite negation, disguised under a gentler
form to avoid wounding what he may regard as respectable
prejudices), it would be as useless to continue our
present argument with such a one, as it would be to
demonstrate the properties of light to a blind man who
did not believe in the existence of light: because,
spirit-manifestations being neither more nor less than
effects of the soul's peculiar qualities, it would be
useless to reason thereupon with one who denies the
soul's existence, and who would require a totally different
line of argument from that of the present work. We
therefore take it for granted that those who read this
book admit the existence and survival of the soul; and
if this basis be admitted, not as a mere probability,
but as an acknowledged and incontestable fact, the existence
of spirits follows as a natural consequence.
5. There still remains the question whether spirits
can communicate with men; in other words, whether they
can exchange thoughts with us. But why should they
not do so? What is a man, if not a spirit imprisoned
in the body? and why should not a free spirit be able
to hold converse with a spirit in prison, just as a
free man can converse with another who is bound in chains?
If you admit the survival of the soul, is it rational
not to admit the survival of the soul's affections?
Since souls are everywhere, is it not natural to believe
that the soul of one who has loved us during life should
come near to us, should desire to communicate with us,
and should, for that purpose, make use of the means
in his power for doing so? Did not his soul, during
his earth-life, act upon the matter of which his body
was composed? Was it not his soul that directed the
movements of his body? Why then, after death, if in
sympathy with another spirit still bound to an earthly
body in order to manifest his thoughts, just as a dumb
man makes use of a man who can speak to express his
wishes? 6. But let us leave out of sight, for the moment,
the phenomena which, for us, render this fact incontestable,
and let us admit its reality simply as an hypothesis;
and considering the question from his point of view,
let us ask the incredulous to prove to us, not by mere
negation - for their personal opinion is no law - but
by arguments based on reason, that such communications
can not take place. We will place ourselves on their
own ground; and, since they insist on judging of spiritism
facts by the laws of matter, we invite them to draw,
from the arsenal of physical science, some demonstration,
mathematical, chemical, or physiological, and to prove
by a plus b (always, however, keeping in mind the principle
acknowledged, viz., that of the existence of survival
of the soul),
1st. That the being who thinks in us
during life will no longer think after death;
2nd.
That, if it thinks, it will not think of those whom
it has loved;
3rd. That, if it thinks of those whom
it has loved, it will not desire to communicate with
them;
4th. That, if it has the power of being everywhere,
it will not have the power of visiting us;
5th. That,
if it can visit us, it will not have the power of communicating
with us;
6th. That it will not be able to act upon
inert matter by means of its fluidic envelope;
7th.
That, if able to act upon inert matter, it will not
be able to act upon an animated being;
8th. That, if
able to act upon an animated being, it will not direct
his hand, and make it write;
9th. That, being able
to guide a human hand in writing, it will not be able
to answer questions, and transmit its own thoughts to
the questioner.
When the adversaries of spiritism shall have proved
all this, by reasoning as incontrovertible as that by
which Galileo proved that the sun does not turn round
the earth, we will admit that their doubts are founded.
But as, up to the present time, their whole argument
may be summed up in words such as these: "I do not
believe these things, therefore they are impossible,"
they will doubtless tell us that it is for us to prove
the reality of the manifestations; to which we reply,
that we prove them both by facts and by reasoning, and
that, if they admit neither the one nor the other, if
they deny even what they see themselves, it is for them
to prove that our reasoning is false, and that the facts
we adduce are impossible.
Text extracted from the "Medium’s Book"
- Written by Allan Kardec